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A persistent criticism of general equilibrium models of monetary pol-
icy which incorporate nominal inertia in the form of the New Keynesian
Phillips Curve (NKPC) is that they fail to capture the extent of inﬂation
inertia in the data. In this paper we derive a general equilibrium model
based on optimising behaviour, but which also implies a data consistent
NKPC. Speciﬁcally our model accounts for nominal inertia in both price
and wage setting as well for habits in consumption. Using US and Eu-
ropean data from 1970 to 1998 our parameter estimates reveal that (i)
there is relatively more inertia in price-setting in Europe; (ii) wage con-
tracts last longer in the US; (iii) the extent of backward-looking behaviour
in price and wage setting is statistically signiﬁcant but small in both the
US and Europe; and (iv) signiﬁcant habits eﬀects are present in European
consumption. Finally we simulate the eﬀects of monetary policy and ﬁnd
that while the magnitude of the impact of monetary policy on the endoge-
nous variables in our estimated models are similar to other econometric
studies, the dynamic paths for variables display less inertia than is typi-
cally found in studies which use output gaps to proxy changes in marginal
costs.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Despite the reputation of macroeconomics as a subject plagued by numerous
ideological disputes, some authors are now arguing that the ﬁeld is developing
a new consensus (see, for example, Woodford (1999) and Goodfriend and King
(1997)). The latter authors have gone as far as dubbing this emerging view,
‘The New Neo-Classical Synthesis’ (NNCS). Essentially the NNCS extends the
optimising behaviour underlying the Real-Business Cycle (RBC) literature to
include the frictions considered by New Keynesian Economists in the 1980s (see
Mankiw and Romer (1991) for a collection of inﬂuential papers). As a result the
NNCS can use the insights of RBC theory to explain equilibrium output, while,
at the same time, explaining deviations of actual output from equilibrium as a
result of stickiness in the adjustment of prices and wages. The NNCS paradigm
has been employed in numerous academic studies of monetary policy (see, for
example, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Clarida et al (1999), Taylor (1999),
and Erceg at al (2000)). Moreover the NNCS has come to dominate policy
evaluation in central banks throughout the world (see Taylor (1999)) and has
even been suggested as the most relevant macroeconomic framework to teach
to undergraduate students (see Taylor (2000) and Romer (2000)).
The NNCS can best be understood with reference to a simple benchmark
model for the analysis of monetary policy 1. Firstly, there is an equation relating
the output gap, b yt, to the future deviation of actual from potential output and
negatively to the real interest rate,




where 1/ρ measures the sensitivity of output to changes in the ex-ante real in-
terest rate, Etb rt. A relationship of this kind can be derived from the optimal
decisions of consumers seeking to maximise their lifetime utility. These con-
sumers may operate as yeoman farmers producing a diﬀerentiated product or
they may supply their labour to imperfectly competitive ﬁrms. Either way it
is assumed that the price of these diﬀerentiated products cannot be adjusted
continuously to clear markets. Instead prices are often assumed to be ﬁxed for
a random period of time as in Calvo (1983) and price setters therefore take this
into account when setting today’s price. This gives rise to the ‘New Keynesian’
Phillips Curve (NKPC),
b πt = Etb πt+1 + αb yt (2)
which relates current inﬂation to expected future inﬂation and the output gap.
The model is then closed by the inclusion of a simple monetary policy rule usu-
ally, although not always, framed in terms of interest rates rather than monetary
aggregates. An inﬂuential example is the rule suggested by Taylor (1993),







1Here a ‘hatted’ variable denotes percentage deviations from steady-state to make it clear
that we are focusing on the New Keynesian features of the synthesis which make it a suitable
framework for the evaluation of monetary policy.
2which says that monetary policy operates to stabilise short-run deviations of
inﬂation from target and output from potential. The microfoundations of the
NNCS also enables welfare measures to be constructed from the utility functions
of the economic agents populating these models (see, for example, Woodford
(1999)).
However, despite the popularity of models of this form in designing and
evaluating monetary policy, they have been criticised on empirical grounds (see,
for example, Mankiw and Reis (2001)). One of the main criticisms of these
models is the apparent lack of empirical support for the NKPC. For example,
Gali and Gertler (2000) report that estimating a NKPC in the form of (2) for the
US and Europe tends to produce a wrongly signed coeﬃcient on excess demand.
Accordingly when Fuhrer and Moore (1995) estimate a hybrid model,
b πt = bEtb πt+1 +( 1− b)b πt−1 + αb yt (4)
they ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on lagged inﬂation is both large and statistically
signiﬁcant2. This is taken as evidence that the NKPC given by (2) is mis-
speciﬁed as it cannot account for the strong degree of inﬂation inertia that
regressions based on (4) suggest.
Galí and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone (2001) have challenged this view in
their estimates of hybrid NKPC curves for the US, while Galí et al (2001) have
done the same for Europe. They point out that deriving the Phillips curve
from proﬁt-maximising behaviour reveals that implicitly the output gap term is
proxying changes in producers’ marginal costs. They show that it is only in the
absence of labour market frictions (which can be either real or nominal) that
the output gap, b yt, will actually be proportional to marginal costs. When they
replace the output gap with a measure of demeaned marginal costs, deﬁned as









they ﬁnd that the statistical problems associated with the NKPC are overcome3.
The extent to which price setting behaviour is backward looking, although sta-
tistically signiﬁcant, is quantitatively small and they conclude that “the [NKPC]
ﬁts the data very well” in both the US and Europe (see Galí et al (2001)).
While these papers oﬀer support for the NKPC, it is not clear how re-
searchers wishing to utilise models such as the benchmark model outlined above
2Rewriting the NKPC (2) as ∆b πt+1 = −αb yt reveals that the coeﬃcient on the output gap,
when it is regressed on the changes in inﬂation, should be negative. However, as noted above,
it is typically found to be weakly positive. The converse of this is that regressions of Phillips
curves assuming adaptive adaptive expectations ∆b πt = αb yt produce signiﬁcantly positive
coeﬃcients on the output gap. Therefore, hybrid Phillips curves, which are essentially a
weighted average of the backward-looking Phillips curves and the NKPC, suggest a signiﬁcant
role for backward-looking behaviour in price setting.
3Gagnon and Khan (2001) have analysed the robustness of these results across diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of utility and production functions for Canada, the US and Europe.
3should proceed. As it stands the benchmark model is mis-speciﬁed since the
assumption that the output gap is a good proxy for movements in marginal
costs is incorrect and the co-movements of variables predicted by this model are
therefore likely to be unrealistic. However, the extensions to the basic model
required to capture the link between the output gap and marginal costs have not
yet been formalised. The current paper attempts to bridge this gap by deriving
a general equilibrium model which allows for both real frictions (as proxied by
consumption-habit eﬀects in labour supply) and nominal frictions in the labour
market as a source of the disparity between the output gap and marginal costs.
Speciﬁcally, in Section 2 we derive a model where consumers allocate their
consumption optimally across time allowing for the fact that the utility they de-
rive from current consumption and leisure depends upon their levels of consump-
tion in the past. Consumers also supply their labour to imperfectly competitive
ﬁrms. They are the monopolistic suppliers of that labour, and we allow for the
possibility that wages can only be renegotiated at random intervals. We further
assume that some workers attempt to maximise their utility over the expected
life of the wage contract, while others follow a simple backward-looking rule of
thumb in resetting wages. This allows us to identify the extent of forward and
backward-looking behaviour in wage setting. The imperfectly competitive ﬁrms
hiring this labour are also only able to adjust their prices at random intervals.
Some ﬁrms will reset prices by selecting a price which maximises the expected
discounted value of ﬁrm proﬁts, while others will implement a backward-looking
rule of thumb which will lead them to select the proﬁt maximising price in the
long-run.
In Section 3, we then estimate this model within a systems-framework using
time-series data for both the US and Europe to obtain estimates of the struc-
tural parameters of the model. While it is interesting to examine each of these
economies individually, it is also insightful to be able to make a comparison
of the monetary transmission mechanism in both economies using a common
framework. This will, for example, help us assess the extent to which the very
diﬀerent labour market institutions in Europe and the US manifest themselves
in diﬀering degrees of nominal inertia and real inertia. Our econometric work
further allows us to obtain estimates of the degree of nominal inertia in both
wages and prices in the two economies, along with the extent to which eco-
nomic agents using backward-looking rules-of-thumb, as opposed to intertem-
poral optimisation, in setting wages and prices. We also attempt to quantify
the responsiveness of output to interest rates, by estimating the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. Finally, our econometric work provides an estimate
of our consumers’ rate of time preference, and the extent to which their past
levels of consumption aﬀect the utility they derive from current consumption
and leisure activities.
Other papers which have attempted to estimate general equilibrium models
for the evaluation of monetary policy include Rotemberg and Woodford (1997),
who derive parameter estimates for the benchmark model outlined above by
matching the implied impulse responses of this model to the impulse responses
of an estimated VAR model of the US economy. A similar approach is followed
4in Amato and Laubauch (2001) and in Christiano et al (2001), again using data
from the US. In the former the model includes stickiness in wages, as well as
prices. The latter allows for habits in consumption and some backward looking
behaviour in price and wage setting. However, by adopting a logarithmic spec-
iﬁcation for utility Christiano et al (op. cit.) essentially impose the size of the
response of output to interest rates, which is an eﬀect we prefer to estimate in
constructing a model for policy analysis. Fuhrer (2000) estimates consumption
functions for the US allowing for habits eﬀects and argues that, in combination
with the hybrid Phillips curve estimates in Fuhrer and Moore (1995), this would
generate a monetary policy model which accurately describes the hump-shaped
responses of inﬂation and output to monetary policy shocks. However, the pol-
icy model employed in their paper implicitly ignores the cross-equation restric-
tions that deriving the model from microfoundations would imply. McCallum
and Nelson (1998) follow a slightly diﬀerent approach by directly estimating
structural parameters using an instrumental variables estimator on US data.
The model they derive is essentially the same as the benchmark model outlined
above, although they allow for price setting to follow a p-bar model as well as
the usual Calvo-formulation.
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 derives the general
equilibrium model. Section 3 then discusses the estimation strategy, results and
simulates the output, wage-inﬂation and price-inﬂation responses to a one-point
one-year rise in the nominal interest rate. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
In this Section, our aim is to formulate a simple model for policy analysis in the
spirit of the benchmark NNCS model discussed in the introduction but which is
also data-consistent. Since there is clear evidence that the output gap is a poor
indicator of marginal costs (see, for example, Galí and Gertler (1999) and Galí
et al (2001)), we extend the benchmark monetary policy model outlined in the
Introduction in three directions. Firstly, we consider the possibility that there
is nominal inertia in wage setting as well as price setting. Secondly, we allow
some price and wage-setters to set prices and wages based on full-optimisation of
their intertemporal objectives, while others follow simple rules-of-thumb based
on recent observable data. Finally, we introduce the possibility that consumers’
consumption and labour supply decisions are intertemporally linked through
habits eﬀects in consumption. By allowing for nominal wage inertia and habits
eﬀects in consumption/labour supply, we allow for the possibility that the output
gap is not proportional to marginal costs.
52.1 Consumer Behaviour
Consumers are assumed to maximise utility over consumption and leisure ac-












The ﬁrst felicity represents consumer i’s utility from consumption of a CES
basket of consumption goods, ci













given the stock of consumption habits, hi
t ,w h e r eθp > 1.A s θp →∞ ,t h e
product market tends towards a state of perfect competition. The second fe-
licity reﬂects the utility derived from leisure, which is the residual of the indi-
vidual’s time endowment (which has a normalised value of 1) after supplying
their labour services to imperfectly competitive ﬁrms. Workers are assumed to
be the monopolistically competitive suppliers of their labour services, Ni
t.T h e





where N(z)t represents a CES aggregate of all the diﬀerentiated labour services











Where, θw > 1, µt, is a productivity shock hitting all ﬁrms, and K(z) is the stock
of capital employed by ﬁrm z,w h i c hw ea s s u m et ob eﬁxed and, for simplicity,
is normalised to 1.4
The underlying utility function is also subject to consumption taste shocks,
εt, and labour supply taste shocks, ζt which, ceteris paribus,a ﬀect the marginal
utility derived from the consumption basket and leisure, respectively. These
taste shocks are common to all consumers. The individual’s stock of habits are




4The simplifying assumption that the capital stock is ﬁxed is a reasonable one, in the con-
text of the present study, for several reasons (see Amato and Laubauch (2001) for a discussion).
In particular, since we are focusing attention on the short-run business cycle properties of a
model with sticky prices, the capital stock may reasonably be held to be constant given this
time frame. Additionally, Woodford (2000) shows that the inclusion of adjustable ﬁrm-speciﬁc
capital in sticky-price models does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the response of output, inﬂation and
marginal costs to monetary policy shocks relative to the case where capital is assumed ﬁxed.
6Since each household is the monopolistic supplier of its own diﬀerentiated labour
services it can choose to set the price of these services. We assume that in each
period a proportion, (1−αw), of households are able to set a new wage. Of these
households a proportion, (1−ωw), set the new wage by seeking to maximise the
discounted value of utility, while the remainder follow a simple rule of thumb.
This wage setting behaviour will be described in detail below. However, for
the moment it is important to note that this means that otherwise identical
households could suﬀer from idiosyncratic shocks to their income due to the
random ability to set wages. Therefore, to make our problem tractable, we follow
Erceg et al (2000) in assuming that full ﬁnancial markets exist, and households
can buy state-contingent claims which allow them to protect their consumption
from the idiosyncratic shocks associated with staggered wage setting. As a
result of these state-contingent claims, and the fact that consumers’ preferences
and initial holdings of ﬁnancial wealth are identical, it will be the case that all
consumers implement identical consumption plans.






t + Πt − τt (11)
where δt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor that gives the current value of real
income at date t +1in any given state at time t. Accordingly the interest rate
on a risk-free real bond must satisfy,
rt = Et[δt,t+1]−1.( 1 2 )
ai
t is real ﬁnancial wealth held in the form of state-contingent claims which com-
pensate for income uncertainty due to staggered wage setting, wi
tNi
t represents
the consumer’s income from supplying labour services and Πt is the consumer’s
share of the proﬁts from all the imperfectly competitive ﬁrms in the economy5.
Consumers also pay real lump-sum taxation of τt, which funds government
spending of gt
6.
Utilising the transition equations for ﬁnancial wealth and the stock of habits,

















t + Πt − τt),c i
t,εt+1,ζt+1). (13)













5In other words, we assume that consumer’s hold a well diversiﬁed portfolio of all the ﬁrms
in the economy, allowing them to eliminate the risks due to staggered price setting.
6For simplicity we assume that the government’s budget constraint is balanced in each
period, and that the level of government spending is constant at its steady-state level g.














If we substitute equations (15) and (16) into the ﬁrst order condition for
consumption we can rewrite this as,
0=uc(ci
t,h i






Leading this equation one period, multiplying by δ
−1
t,t+1, applying the law of
















This is the consumer’s Euler equation for consumption in the presence of habits
and uncertainty. In general, this equation is unsolveable for general forms of
uncertainty. Therefore we will adopt speciﬁc functional forms for the utility
function7, specify the sources of uncertainty and linearise the model around its










This element of the utility function is the same as that considered in Carroll
(2001), who also provides a discussion of its properties. We assume, for simplic-
ity, that consumers know of the value of the common taste shocks shocks hitting
the economy in period t, before they make their consumption and wage setting
decisions. Since our assumptions imply that consumers implement idential con-
sumption plans, we can substitute for the marginal utilities of consumption and
habits in equation (18) and aggregate across consumers to obtain the aggregate

















































7A st h e s ef o r m sa r ec o m m o n l ya d o p t e di nt h el i t e r a t u r et h i sw i l la l s oa l l o wu st oc o m p a r e
our estimates with values adopted either by assumption, calibration or estimation in other
studies.
8Noting that yt = ct+gt and assuming that government spending is always equal
to its steady-state level, allows us to log-linearise this expression as,


















where λc = ρ+υρ−υ+υ2βρ−υβ−υ2β , ϕc = −2υβ+υβρ+ρ+υ2βρ−υ2β, and
a ‘hatted’ variable denotes percentage deviation from a steady-state which, in
turn, is denoted by ‘barred’ variables. The presence of habits mean that current
consumption not only depends upon the expectation of future consumption it
also depends upon past consumption. There are also real interest rate eﬀects
and eﬀects from the consumption taste shock εt .S e t t i n gν =0,w o u l dr e m o v e
the impact of habits, such that this equation would reduce to the standard Euler
equation for consumption.
2.2 Wage Setting
We now need to consider the wage-setting behaviour on the part of households.
In each period a proportion, (1−αw), of households are able to set a new wage.
It is assumed that of these households a proportion, (1−ωw), set the new price
by seeking to maximise the discounted value of utility, while the remainder
follow a simple rule of thumb. The expected utility gained from a household
charging wage Wi

















where the ﬁrst term in curly brackets represents the real income generated by
supplying the Ni
t+s units of labour demanded by ﬁrms at wage, Wi
t, multiplied
by the marginal utility of that income in period t+s. While the second term in
square brackets reﬂects the utility of leisure which is decreasing in the supply
of labour. These per period utilities are discounted using a per-period discount
factor, αwβ,w h i c hr e ﬂects the household’s rate of time preference and the prob-
ability that the wage Wi
t will still remain in place in the next period. In order
to make this problem tractable we need to substitute the demand curve facing
wage-setters, the marginal utility of consumption and the utility of leisure into
this objective function.
Maximising the index of labour services (9) for a given level of wage payments









where Nt is the index of aggregate labour supply, and the aggregate wage index,
















We can then use the demand for labour, (23), and the deﬁnitions of the two
felicities underpinning household utility, (19) and (25), to rewrite the objective




























































t is the nominal wage set in period t by optimising wage-setters who
are able to reset their wage in that period. The ﬁrst-order condition obtained
by maximising this objective function with respect to Wo



































We also allow for the possibility that not all workers follow this optimisation.
Due to the costs of collecting and processing information, some workers may
reset their wage according to simple rules of thumb. We follow Sbordone (2001)
in assuming that the rule of thumb such workers use is to set their wage at







t is the wage set by backward-looking rule-of-thumb wage setters this
period, W∗
t−1is the average wage set by those that where able to reset wages in
the previous period, and πw
t−1 i st h er a t eo fw a g ei n ﬂa t i o ni nt h ep r e v i o u sp e r i o d .
This captures the idea that workers may diﬀer in their abilities to forecast future
economic conditions (see Sims (1998)), such that some workers essentially free-
ride on the eﬀorts of others to set an optimal wage by implementing a rule
based on wages set by others. Provided the proportion of households which set
wages optimally is large enough then the costs of following this rule of thumb
will be relatively small. Appendix 1 details the log-linearised dynamics of wage
inﬂation after combining the wage-setting decisions of forward and backward-














(1 − ωw)(1 − αw)(1 − αwβ)
(1 + η N
1−Nθw)λw
b Zt (29)
10where λw = ωw + βωwαw + αw − ωwαw,





(b st − b wt) −

























and b st = b wt + b Nt − b yt which reﬂects labour’s share of income and is equiva-
lent to the log-linearised marginal cost of production given our Cobb-Douglas
production function, (8).
2.3 Firms’ Pricing Behaviour
Firm z is the monopolistic supplier of good z, which it produces according to
the production function (8). In each period a proportion, (1 − αP),o fﬁrms
are able to set a new price. Of these ﬁrms a proportion, (1 − ωP),s e tt h e
new price by seeking to maximise the discounted value of proﬁts, while the
remainder follow a simple rule of thumb. By maximising the index (7) for a given
level of consumption expenditure and aggregating across consumers, consumers’
demand for the individual products that make up their consumption baskets is















Aggregate demand for output is deﬁned as yt = ct+gt, where government spend-
ing is allocated across goods in the same pattern as consumption spending by
maximising an index of the same form as (7). Therefore, the ﬁrms choosing the
reset price optimally will choose a price, Po
t , to maximise expected discounted






































11where Wt is the index of the nominal wage rate in period t. The ﬁrst-order
































Analogous to the wage setting process, we also allow for the possibility that
some ﬁrms reset prices by implementing a simple rule of thumb such that they
set a price, Pb
t , equal to the average price set by those ﬁrms which adjusted price
in the previous period, P∗
t−1,a f t e ri n ﬂa t i n gt h a tp r i c eb yt h er a t eo fi n ﬂation






Appendix 2 details the log-linearisation of these pricing decisions, which yields














(1 − ωP)(1 − αP)(1 − αPβ)
(1 + (φ − 1)θP)λp
b st (36)
where λp = ωp+βωpαp+αp−ωpαp ,a n db st = b wt+ b Nt−b yt .This hybrid Phillips
curve is the same as that derived in Gali et al (2001).
The model derived in this section can now be seen to incorporate a number of
interesting eﬀects within a micro-founded general equilibrium framework, such
that the theoretical models underpinning the empirical studies discussed in the
introduction are often special cases of our model. By encompassing existing
studies and subjecting the model to conventional econometric estimation, we
shall be able to discriminate between competing representations of the NNCS.
This is the subject of the next section.
3 Econometric Method, Results and Simulations
In this Section we ﬁrst set out the methods employed to estimate the parameters
of the model derived in Section 2 for the US and Europe. We next examine the
robustness of these estimates and discuss them in the context of ﬁndings from
other partial and general equilibrium studies. This discussion allows us to draw
a number of useful conclusions of direct relevance to policy makers. Finally
we analyse the response of our model to monetary policy shocks as a means
of assessing the importance of the various monetary transmission mechanisms
linking the interest rate instrument with the real and nominal economies, and
the diﬀerences in estimated parameters across the US and Europe.
3.1 Estimation Method
The general equilibrium model which we estimate consists of three equations.
These include the Euler equation for output in the presence of habits (i.e. equa-
tion (21)) and two Phillips curves describing the dynamic path of wage and price
12inﬂation (i.e. equations (29) and (36)). Given that our model incorporates for-
ward looking rational expectations (RE) and since we wish to conduct policy
analysis using the estimated ‘deep parameters’, we employ Hansen’s (1982) gen-
eralised method of moments (GMM) estimator. The RE hypothesis suggests a
set of orthogonality conditions that can be naturally handled within the GMM
framework. To illustrate how we apply GMM to obtain parameter estimates
and speciﬁcation consistent standard errors, consider the following system of
nonlinear equations given by (21), (29) and (36).
yt = f(θ,xt)+ut (37)




t , b yt]
0 or equivalently
[f1(θ1,x 1t)+u1t; f2(θ2,x 2t)+u2t; f3(θ3,x 3t)+u3t]0; θ is the (16x1) vector of
unknown parameters, [θ1(= αp,ωp,θp,β,φ); θ2(= αe,ωw,θw,β,φ,η,υ,ρ; θ3(=









t−1,(b st − b wt),b yt+1,b yt−1); x3t(= b yt+2, b yt+1, b yt−1, {rt − b π
p
t+1})]0;
and ut is the (3x1) vector of errors [u1t,u 2t,u 3t]0.




Et[y1t − f1(θ,xt)]zt =0
Et[y2t − f2(θ,xt)]zt =0
Et[y3t − f3(θ,xt)]zt =0

 (38)




0 ; zt is













t−1, constant term]0; b π
c refers to commodity price inﬂation and we as-
sume that Et(zt,ut)=0.
Given the above setup we obtain the GMM estimate of the unknown para-




















T is an estimate of the inverse of the covariance matrix of sample
moments. Since our theory imposes a common β across all three equations,
8Our instruments set is based on the one used in Galí and Gertler (1999). We conduct
Hansen’s J-test to test the validity of our overidentifying restrictions since we have more
instruments than parameters to estimate. Given that this test uses up many degrees of
freedom, e.g. J˜χ2(r−a) it may be possible to achieve more power by reducing the number of
degrees of freedom (see Davidson and MacKinnon, op cit, pp 616). In our model r =3 ·(5·4+1),
(i.e. 3 equations, 5 variables, 4 lags and a constant). In an attempt to increase the power of
this test, our instrument set zt does not include four lags of the spread between the long and
short interest rate used in Galí and Gertler (1999). We also experimented with alternative
subsets of our instrument set zt employing as few as 12 regressors and found that the J-test was
robust, i.e. we could not reject the validity of these alternative instrument sets. Additionally,
the parameter estimates associated with these were reasonably robust. However, none of the
alternative sets employed yielded standard errors which were as eﬃcient as those obtained by
using the instruments currently deﬁned in zt. The results based on the alternative sets will
be made available on request.
13ac o m m o nφ across the two inﬂation equations and a common ν across the
wage inﬂation and Euler equations we have in eﬀect 11 unique parameters to
estimate. Given the dimension of xt this implies that we must condition our
estimations on at least one restricted parameter. Moreover formal identiﬁcation
additionally necessitates satisfaction of order and rank conditions. The order
condition requires that (r ≥ a), and the rank, discussed further below, that the
columns of the plim of b D0
T be linearly independent, where
b D0






|θ =b θ T
. (40)
3.2 Estimation Results9
We next report the result of estimating the elements of θ for the US and the Euro
Area over the period 1970.1 to 1998.210. Note that all of the model’s variables
expressed as rates are transformed to deviations from steady-state by removing
their mean prior to estimation, whereas a deterministic polynomial time trend is
removed from the levels variables. Further note that while the rank condition is
clearly satisﬁed for our model, extensive numerical examination of the columns
of b D0
T indicated that the imposition of any four elements of the parameter vector
θ is required before a stable solution to the minimisation of (39) can be achieved.
In selecting which parameters to restrict, we have chosen to condition on values
which appear to be widely accepted in the literature and/or have also been
employed in other conditional estimations. For example, the results reported
in this Section are based on values of θp = θw =1 1 , η =1 .5 and φ =1 .66
(for the US) and 1.47 (for Europe). The values of θp,a n dφ are taken from
Galí et al 2001 who also estimate a price hybrid NKPC conditioned on these
values. Our value of η of 1.5 is taken from Erceg et al (2000). Finally, we also
follow Erceg et al (op. cit.) in assuming that 1/3 of workers’ productive time is
spent working, the remaining 2/3 in leisure such that N/(1−N)=1 /2.W ea l s o
assume that the share of consumption in output, c/y is 0.81 as in McCallum and
Nelson (1998). This value is also consistent with estimates for a typical OECD
economy provided by Galí (1994) once it is recognised that our deﬁnition of
government spending does not include transfers11
9All of the econometric estimation is carried out using TSP Version 4.5.
10The US and Euro area data we employ were kindly supplied by Jordi Galí, Mark Gertler
and David López-Salido. The US data is described in Gali Gertler (1999) and the Euro area
data in Gali et (2001). The original source for the Euro area data is Fagan et al (2001).
11Note that our φ is equivalent to the Gali et al 1/(1-α), where (1 − α) is the elasticity of
output with respect to employment and is 0.4 and 0.32 for the US and Europe respectively.
Additionally our θp is equal to the Gali et al ε = µ/(µ − 1) where µ is the price mark-up
(=1.1) for the US and Europe. We further assume the θp = θw since there is no obvious
reason to assume diﬀerent degrees of market power in the labour and product markets. Finally
note that we considered the robustness of our results to changes in these imposed paraneters,
by allowing θp and θw to vary between 4 and 21. These values cover a range found in other
econometric or calibration studies, see, for example, Erceg et al (op. cit.) who set θp = θw =4
and Erceg et al (op. cit.) who assess the robustness of their results by imposing θp =2 1.W e
14Given that it is possible to calculate a heteroscedastic, autocorrelation con-
sistent (HAC) matrix b S, in the GMM framwork and since this estimator clearly
dominates its rivals when both problems are present (see Andrews 1991)), we
ﬁrst check the properties of the errors resulting from the GMM estimation of
our 3-equation system to see if this is required. A further important reason for
checking the properties of the errors relates to another of Andrew’s ﬁndings.
That is, none of the HAC estimators he considers is reliable for sample sizes up
to 250 if the errors follow an AR(1) process with an autocorrelation parameter
greater than 0.90.
Table 1: Autocorrelations
US (Price Inﬂation) Europe (Price Inﬂation)
Lag k AR(k) Q-Stat Prob AR(k) Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.44 22.44 0.000 -0.38 15.90 0.000
4 0.13 24.86 0.000 0.15 25.23 0.000
8 0.10 32.69 0.000 0.15 30.49 0.000
12 -0.07 34.94 0.000 0.08 32.21 0.001
US (Wage Inﬂation) Europe (Wage Inﬂation)
Lag k AR(k) Q-Stat Prob AR(k) Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.57 36.74 0.000 -0.46 23.60 0.000
4 0.10 40.64 0.000 0.20 32.11 0.000
8 0.14 58.98 0.000 0.02 33.83 0.000
12 0.12 61.27 0.000 -0.16 50.14 0.001
US (Output) Europe (Output)
Lag k AR(k) Q-Stat Prob AR(k) Q-Stat Prob
1 0.27 8.51 0.004 -0.06 0.38 0.537
4 0.05 12.82 0.012 0.20 19.49 0.001
8 -0.29 25.92 0.001 -0.03 20.10 0.007
12 -0.23 33.27 0.001 -0.16 24.46 0.018
Notes: (i) AR(k) is the autocorrelation coeﬃcient for the errors at lag k; (ii) the Q-
statistic at lag k is a test statistic for the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation
up to order k (see Ljung and Box (1979)), Q~χ2(k); and (iii) US sample: 70.1-97.4;
EU sample: 71.2-97.4.
also varied the labour supply parameter, η between 0.5 and 4, which encompasses the values
of η assumed in a number of studies, including η = 1 a value commonly imposed by adopting
a logarithmic utility function in RBC models following Prescott (1986). In all cases varying
the imposed parameters in these ways did not materially aﬀect the results of our estimation.
15Table 2: Variance of Errors
constant T T2 T3 χ2(1)
US (70.1-97.4)
Price Inﬂation 0.11 -0.001 - - 15.73
(0.000) (0.000) - - -
Wage Inﬂation 0.83 -0.041 0.001 -3.8E-6 15.50
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.007) -
Output 1.76 -0.016 - - 10.63
(0.000) (0.001) - - -
Europe (71.2-97.4)
Price Inﬂation 0.16 -0.001 - - 14.19
(0.000) (0.000) - - -
Wage Inﬂation 0.54 -0.002 - - 0.57
(0.001) (0.453) - - -
Output 0.28 -0.001 - - 0.79
(0.000) (0.38) - - -
Notes: (i) the dependent variable for the ancillary regressions reported above is the
square of the residuals from the GMM estimation of the 3-equation system; (ii) the
White (1980) test is calculated as N ·(R2)~χ2(1);( i i i )t h ec r i t i c a lv a l u eo fχ2(1) =
3.84; and (iv) the numbers in parentheses are p-values.
The results reported in Table 1 clearly show that while there is signiﬁcant
serial correlation in the errors of all 3 equations they are all stationary. Addi-
tionally Table 2 indicates that there does not appear to be heteroscedasticity
in the errors of the European wage inﬂation and output equations of the simple
form tested for. However visual inspection of the plots of the residuals squared
over time clearly suggests that: (i) the wage inﬂation error variance post 1983
is greater than the pre-1983 period; and (ii) the error variance for output post
1983 is greater than the pre-1983 period, especially when account is taken of
the outlying observations in 1974 and 198112. Given these results, to obtain
standard errors which are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of
unknown form, we calculate b S using the Newey and West (1987) estimator, e.g.
b ST = b Γ0,T +
q X
v=1
{1 − [v/(q +1 ) ] }(b Γv,T + b Γ0
v,T) (41)
where
b Γv,T =+ ( 1 /T)
T X
t=v+1
[h(b θ,wt)][h(b θ,wt−v)]0 (42)
12In the interests of preserving space, we have not included these plots but will provide
them on request.
16and q is the lag truncation parameter13.
The results of our estimation are reported in Table 3.
Table 3: GMM Parameter Estimates
US (θp = θw =1 1 , η =1 .5, φ =1 .66)
Parameters
αp ωp αw ωw υβρ J.Test
0.51 0.83 0.88 0.175 (n/a) 0.83 7.54 12.67
[0.188] [0.161] [0.026] [0.031] (n/a) [0.016] [2.71]
Euro Area (θp = θw =1 1 , η =1 .5, φ =1 .47)
Parameters
αp ωp αw ωw υβρ J.Test
0.66 0.19 0.74 0.11 0.34 0.74 7.5 12.43
[0.010] [0.016] [0.012] [0.021] [0.014] [0.014] (n/a)
Notes: (i) the R2’s for the US price and wage inﬂation and output equations are 0.86,
0.55 and 0.86 respectively; (ii) the R2’s for the European price and wage inﬂation
and output equations are 0.89, 0.69 and 0.92 respectively; (iii) the critical value of
χ2(r − a) =75.8 where r − a =5 7 ; (iv) the numbers in square brackets are HAC
standard errors.
Aside from diﬀerences in estimated parameter values (which we discuss be-
low), the estimations diﬀer between the two economies in two ways. Firstly, we
were unable to estimate a value of ρ for Europe which was both statistically
signiﬁcant and of a believable magnitude. Secondly, we could not ﬁnd any evi-
dence of signiﬁcant habits eﬀects in the US data once we impose the constraint
that υ < 1. This condition is necessary to avoid the undesirable property that
steady-state utility is decreasing in consumption.
The problem of ﬁnding signiﬁcant real interest rate eﬀects in output equa-
tions is well known. Fair (2001), for example, estimates equations for various
components of aggregate demand using real and nominal interest rates for a va-
riety of economies. What is interesting about these results, as far as the present
study is concerned, is that only the US, Canada and India were signiﬁcant real
interest rate eﬀects on consumption found. For most European economies there
is little evidence of real interest rate eﬀects on consumption, although the im-
pact of real rates on investment is greater. This may explain why the coeﬃcient
on the real interest rate term in the Euler equation was poorly determined in
13In the estimations reported in Table 3, the value of q is equal to 8. Note that we use the
Bartlett spectral density kernal to insure the positive deﬁniteness of the covariance matrix of
the orthogonality conditions (see Newey and West, 1987). Further note that these results are
extremely robust to alternative values of q, e.g. we examined values ranging from 4 to 12. To
preserve space, these results are not reported but will be made available from the authors on
request.
17Europe. As a result, we condition our European estimates on a value of ρ equal
to 7.54, as this is consistent with the estimated value for the US and implies a
modest response of output to changes in interest rates. We should add here that
our results were robust to changes in this imposed parameter, e.g. we considered
values of ρ lying between 4 and 10 without materially aﬀecting the results of
our estimated parameters14.
3.2.1 Interpretation of Estimated Parameters
We now turn to consider the economic interpretation of our estimated parameter
values in the US and Europe. The estimated value of αp of 0.66 for Europe
indicates that it takes on average 9 months for ﬁrms to reset their prices, while
in the US the estimated parameter value of 0.51 suggests that the degree of
inertia in prices is lower with prices being reset after 6 months, on average. Our
ﬁndings regarding the average length of time taken to adjust prices in the US
is broadly consistent with survey evidence. For example, Blinder (1994) ﬁnds
that prices remained ﬁxed for an average of 9 months in the US. Carlton (1986)
found that prices in his sample remained ﬁxed from between 4 and 13 months
in his sample depending on the particular product. Kashyap (1995) examined
products listed in the L.L.Bean catalogue and found that these prices were held
ﬁxed from between 11 and 30 months. Our estimate for the US is slightly lower
than these ﬁgures at just over 6 months. They are, however, consistent with
the estimates of Galí and Gertler (2001) for both the US and Europe. We also
estimate equivalent parameters in our Phillips curve describing the dynamics of
wage inﬂation. The estimated value of αw in Europe of 0.74 implies that the
average length of wage contracts in Europe are one year, while the corresponding
estimate for the US of 0.88 implies an average contract length of approximately
two years. There is less evidence on the average length of labour contracts in
the US and Europe. However, most labour contracts in Europe are negotiated
annually in contrast to the US where 3-year wage contracts are more prevalent
(see Bruno and Sachs (1985), pp. 245 and 247). This suggests that our average
ﬁgure of 2 years for the US and 1 year for Europe are not inconsistent with the
stylised facts.
The estimated parameter, ωp, measures the proportion of ﬁrms which utilise
a simple backward-looking rule of thumb when resetting their price, rather than
attempting to maximise discounted proﬁt s . I ts h o u l db ep o i n t e do u tt h a ta l -
though this rule of thumb does not emerge from an explicit maximisation, it will
lead to rule-of-thumb ﬁrms adopting the proﬁt maximising price in the long-run
provided a suﬃcient number of ﬁrms set prices optimally. Here our estimates
imply that 18.5% of ﬁrms in Europe follow the rule-of-thumb behaviour, while
31% of ﬁrms in the US do so. One possible explanation for this ﬁnding is that
since prices are reset less frequently in Europe the costs of failing to reset that
price optimally are greater. In contrast, in the US, since prices are reset with
greater frequency it may be more costly for ﬁrms to collect the information to
14Note that we discuss the results for other empirical studies in the next subsection.
18reset prices optimally every time. The extent of backward looking behaviour in
price setting that we ﬁnd is also consistent with the parameter estimates of Galí
et al (2001). This is in contrast to reduced form estimates of the hybrid Phillips
curve for inﬂation which use the output gap as its measure of marginal costs
(see, for example, Fuhrer and Moore (1995) or Chadha et al (1992)). Since out-
put appears to lead inﬂation in the raw data, simple regressions of the change
in inﬂation on an output gap yield a signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient (see Galí
and Gertler (1999) and Mankiw (2000) for a discussion of this point) suggesting
that a backward-looking Phillips curve ﬁts the raw data better than the basic
forward-looking NKPC. In estimates of the hybrid NKPC Phillips curve this
then manifests itself by placing a greater weight on the backward-looking spec-
iﬁcation implying an implausible degree of backward-looking behaviour. The
problem with these estimates is that they are generated by a mis-speciﬁed model
to the extent that the output gap is not an accurate measure of marginal costs.
Our ﬁnding of signiﬁcant inertia in wage setting in both the US and Europe,
and the presence of habits in consumption/labour supply in Europe implies that
the output gap is not proportional to marginal costs. Accordingly estimates of
Phillips curves which rely on output gaps as their measure of marginal costs
tend to overestimate the degree of backward looking behaviour in price setting.
We also provide an estimate of the proportion of wage contracts which are set
to maximise workers’ utility and the number based a simple backward-looking
rule-of-thumb, ωw. The proportion of rule-of-thumb wage setters are 11% and
17.4% in the Europe and the US respectively. Here the extent of backward-
looking behaviour in both economies is even lower than in the case of price
setting. This could reﬂe c tt h ef a c tt h a taﬁrm could be pricing a range of
products such that the price charged on a speciﬁc product may not materially
aﬀect the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, thereby allowing the ﬁrm to follow a rule-of-thumb
which allows them to free-ride on the optimal price-setting behaviour of others.
This is then reinforced by the fact that the price is unlikely to remain in force
for longer than 9 months in Europe or 6 months in the US. In the case of wage
setting, however, workers do not typically provide labour to more than one ﬁrm
and the wage they negotiate is likely to remain in place for at least one year
(possibly longer in the US), and so any mispricing of their labour is likely to
materially aﬀect their utility. Accordingly wage setting behaviour attempts to
maximise utility whenever there is the opportunity to reset the wage. The fact
the extent of backward-looking wage setting behaviour is lower in Europe than
the US, even although contracts last longer in the US is also worthy of comment.
One possible explanation for this is that the prevalence of collective bargaining
in Europe reduces the costs per worker of collecting the information necessary
to negotiate an optimal wage.
Our estimation also generates estimates of three other structural parameters.
Firstly the parameter, ρ, which implies an intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion of consumption of 1
ρ. Our estimate of ρ for the US of 7.5 is consistent with
other empirical studies. For example, McCallum and Nelson (1998) estimate a
value of ρ of 5, while Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) estimate ρ to be 6.25
19and Fuhrer (2000) estimates ρ to lie in the range 6 to 13.1. Secondly we esti-
mate υ which captures the extent to which past consumption, aﬀects current
consumption and labour supply decisions. A value of zero indicates that there
are no ‘habits’ eﬀects in our model, while a value of 1 suggests that it is only
the value of current consumption relative to past consumption that matters -
the level of consumption is unimportant. The value of 0.34 for Europe provides
evidence of habits in consumption, although this is lower than some estimates
of the importance of habits in single equation estimates of consumption equa-
tions (see, for example, Fuhrer’s (2000) results for the US). The ﬁnal parameter
we estimate is β, the discount factor in each economy. Our estimation implies
estimates of β of 0.83 in the US and 0.74 in Europe, which are in line with
the estimates of β for the US in Galí et al (2001), but slightly lower than their
European estimates. Overall these estimates of β imply that consumers’ rate of
time preference is fairly high. However, what the data may be picking up here
are mark-ups over the real rate of interest arising from uncertainty not explicitly
included in our model. For example, the presence of ﬁnite lives will tend to raise
the rate at which consumers discount future labour income above the risk-free
rate of interest. Accordingly our estimates of β not only reﬂect the consumers’
rate of time preference which implies an equilibrium risk-free real interest rate,
but also implicitly includes risk premia reﬂecting risks not formally included in
our model.
3.3 Simulations
The model estimated in the previous subsection contains dynamic equations for
wage and price inﬂation, (equations (29) and (36)) and output (equation (21)).
There are also technical relationships and identities implied by our theory which
link these equations: the production function, b yt = 1
φ b Nt, the labour share of
output b st = b wt + b Nt − b yt, the real wage, b wt = c Wt − b Pt, and the evolution of
nominal wages, c Wt = c Wt−1+b π
w
t and the price level, b Pt = b Pt−1+b π
p
t. The model
is then closed by specifying a rule for policy. For the purposes of illustration we
adopt a Taylor rule for monetary policy (see Taylor (1993)),







which indicates that the monetary authorities adjust nominal interest rates,
b Rt such that real rates rise in response to excess inﬂation and positive output
gaps. We then assume that the economy was initially in equilibrium before the
monetary authorities unexpectedly raise nominal interest rates over and above
the level implied by the Taylor rule by 1 point for 1 year. The paths for output,
price and wage inﬂation for the US and Europe in the face of this shock are
given in column 1 of Figure 115.
15Given that our model has forward expectations, we require a solution algorithm which
allows us to impose model consistent expectations. We carry out our simulations using
WinSolve, Version 3 (see Pierse, (2000)) using the Stacked Newton solution method (see
Boucekkine, (1995)).
20{Insert Figure 1 around here.}
The diﬀerences in the paths of variables between the US and Europe, reﬂect the
diﬀerences in the estimated parameters for the two economies. Prices adjust
faster in the US than in Europe, while the opposite is true of wages. However,
despite the fact that price inertia is greater in Europe, output does not fall
by as much in Europe relative to the US economy. This reason for this is the
presence of habits in consumption, reducing the fall in consumption following
the tightening of monetary policy. The size of this eﬀect is revealed by the
second column which plots the paths for the same variables for Europe in the
face of the same shock, with and without habits eﬀects in consumption. In the
absence of habits the initial fall in consumption is greater and as a result both
wages and prices are forced to adjust by more. By comparing column 1 with
column 2 this suggests that most of the diﬀerences in price and wage adjustment
are not due to diﬀerences in the degree of nominal inertia between the US and
Europe, but are actually capturing real inertia in the European economy, which
in our model enters through habits eﬀects.
To examine the importance of backward looking behavior in the model, we
set the proportion of backward-looking price and wage setters in both economies
to zero. In other words we now have purely forward-looking wage and price set-
ting in both economies. As we can see from the graphs in column 3, the impact
on the real economy is negligible, and although there are diﬀerences in the paths
for wage and price inﬂation, these diﬀerences appear to be quantitatively small,
particularly in the case of wage inﬂation. Accordingly it appears to be the case
that the New Keynesian Phillips curve captures movements in the data well,
especially once it is recognised that it applies to wages as well as prices, and
that the European economy may also feature some real inertia in the form of
habits eﬀects in consumption.
Finally, there are several aspects to note about the dynamic paths of the
variables in our model following this monetary policy shock. The ﬁrst is that
the magnitude of responses of output and inﬂation to this shock are in line
with studies based on the VAR methodology (see, for example, Christiano et al
(2001)) as well as simulations from large-scale macroeconometric models (see
for example McKibbin and Sachs (1991)). However, while the dynamic paths
of these variables in response to a monetary shock are relatively smooth, they
do not follow the slow ‘hump-shaped’ responses reported in these VAR-based
studies. While our model is in principle capable of generating such responses
to monetary shocks, it would require a much stronger degree of habits and
backward-looking behaviour in price and wage setting than we found in our
econometric work16. It appears therefore that the VARs tend to overestimate
16VAR analyses of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, based on correlations of
inﬂation, output gaps and interest rates, often suggest that the peak response of inﬂation
to a monetary shock comes two years after the shock (see, for example, Mankiw (2000) for
a discussion of the evidence underlying this stylized fact). The peak inﬂation response is
led by the peak response of output which is greatest after around one year. Our model can
generate these results for both countries, but only if the proportion of wage and price-setters
21the extent of inﬂation inertia since they employ output gaps as a proxy for
movements in marginal costs.
4 Summary and Conclusions
Recent work by Galí and Gertler (1999) and Galí et al (2001) has pointed out
that previous estimates of hybrid NKPCs have been mis-speciﬁed by basing
their measure of marginal costs on the output gap. As a result, speciﬁca-
tions based on output gap measures have tended to overestimate the extent
of backward-looking behaviour. Based on this insight, we derive and estimate
general equilibrium models for the evaluation of monetary policy which are sim-
ilar in structure to the benchmark mark model of the NNCS (Goodfriend and
King, op. cit.). Our work extends the basic benchmark model by allowing for a
number of potential channels which could explain the link between the output
gap and marginal costs. For example, we ﬁrst allow for the possibility that it is
not only prices, but also wages which are sticky. Second we model the extent
to which some economic agents use backward-looking rules of thumb when set-
ting wages and/or prices, while others attempt to maximise lifetime utility or
discounted proﬁts. Finally, we introduce habits into consumption to allow for
inertia in output.
Our estimates of these models produce a number of interesting results. For
example, we ﬁnd that there is more price stickiness in Europe than in the US,
with prices taking on average 9 months and 6 months, respectively to adjust.
In the case of wages, wage contracts in Europe typically last for one year, while
our estimates imply average contract lengths of two years in the US, perhaps
reﬂecting the signiﬁcant number of three-year contracts in the US labour market.
In both wage and price setting there is evidence of a statistically signiﬁcant
level of backward-looking behaviour. US price setters are more likely to use a
rule-of-thumb than their European counterparts, possibly reﬂecting the costs
of obtaining information necessary to reset prices optimally when that price is
unlikely to remain in place for long. In contrast, wage setters in Europe are less
likely to be backward looking than in the US. This may reﬂect the prevalence
of collective-bargaining procedures in Europe relative to the US. We also found
evidence of signiﬁcant habits eﬀects in consumption in Europe.
Finally we considered the response of each economy to a monetary policy
shock in the form of a temporary rise in nominal interest rates. Here our results
indicated that the presence of backward-looking behaviour in wage and price
s e t t i n gh a do n l yav e r ys m a l le ﬀect on the paths of real and nominal variables in
our economies, leading us to conclude that the NKPC provides is a reasonable
description of inﬂation dynamics. This also suggests that empirical evidence on
the degree of inertia in the economy derived from correlations of output gaps
and inﬂation may signiﬁcantly overestimate the degree of backward-looking be-
are imposed at 95%, while the coeﬃcient on habits is set at υ =0 .9. Not surprisingly, it is
easy to show that these parameters are statistically diﬀerent from our estimated parameters,
whether we test their imposition individually or collectively.
22haviour in price and wage setting. We also found that the existence of signiﬁcant
habits eﬀects in consumption accounted for more of the diﬀerences in response
to the monetary policy shock between Europe and the US than any diﬀerences
in the degree of nominal inertia in either wages or prices. Therefore, to the
extent that these habits eﬀects are capturing real inertia in the European econ-
omy this may explain a key diﬀerence in the responses of the two economies to
monetary policy.
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((1 − ρ)Etb ct+s+1 +( υρ− 1 − υ)b ct+s)].




































The households which do not perform this optimisation, instead follow a rule of
thumb whereby they set a wage equal to the average wage set on the previous
period after scaling this up by the rate of inﬂa t i o no b s e r v e di nt h ep r e v i o u s
period. Therefore, the log-linearised index of wages is given by,
c Wt = αwc Wt−1 +( 1− αw)c W∗
t (46)
where W∗
t is the average reset price in period t and is given by,
c W∗
t =( 1− ωw)c Wo
t + ωc Wb
t (47)
ωw is the proportion of households following the rule of thumb, and Wb
t is the
price set set according to the rule of thumb,
c Wb
t = c W∗
t−1 + b π
w
t−1. (48)
Substituting equation (48) into (47) gives,
c W∗
t =( 1− ωw)c Wo
t + ωwc W∗
t−1 + ωwc Wt−1 − ωwc Wt−2. (49)















+ωwc Wt−1 − ωwc Wt−2. (50)
27This can be rearranged in terms of c Wo








(1 − αw)(1 − ωw)
−
(ωw + αw)c Wt
(1 − αw)(1 − ωw)
+
αwωwc Wt−1














(1 − αw)(1 − ωw)
−
(αw + ωw)b Pt−1
(1 − αw)(1 − ωw)
+ (51)
αwωwc Wt−2








− b Pt+s + θwη
N
1 − N










(ρ − 1)Etb ct+1 +
υ
1+υβ








T h i sc a nb et h e ns o l v e du s i n gt h ed e ﬁnition of nominal wage inﬂation, b π
W
t =
c Wt −c Wt−1, the national accounting identity, b y = c
yb ct+
g
yb gt and the assumption
that government spending is ﬁxed at its steady-state level, to give the wage-
inﬂation Phillips curve (30) in the text.
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)sEt[(1 + θp(φ − 1))b Pt+s (52)
+b wt+s +( φ − 1)b yt+s − φµt+s].
This inﬁnite forward summation, can also be quasi-diﬀerenced to give a ﬁrst









t − (φ − 1)b yt + φµt
−(1 + θp(φ − 1))b Pt − b wt. (53)
The ﬁrms which do not perform this optimisation, instead follow a rule of thumb
whereby they set a price equal to the average price set on the previous period
28after scaling this up by the rate of inﬂation observed in the previous period.
Therefore, the log-linearised index of consumer prices is given by,
b Pt = αp b Pt−1 +( 1− αp)b p∗
t (54)
where p∗ is the average reset price in period t and is given by,
b p∗
t =( 1− ωp)b Po
t + ωpb pb
t (55)
ωp is the proportion of ﬁrms following the rule of thumb, and pb
t is the price set
set according to the rule of thumb,
b pb
t = b p∗
t−1 + b π
p
t−1. (56)
Substituting equation (56) into (55) gives,
b p∗
t =( 1− ωp)b Po
t + ωpb p∗
t−1 + ωp b Pt−1 − ωp b Pt−2. (57)















+ωp b Pt−1 − ωp b Pt−2. (58)
This can be rearranged in terms of b Po







(1 − αp)(1 − ωp)
−
(ωp + αp)b Pt
(1 − αp)(1 − ωp)
+
αpωp b Pt−1













(1 − αp)(1 − ωp)
−
(ωp + αp)b Pt−1












− (1 + θp(φ − 1))b Pt − b wt − (φ − 1)b yt + φµt.
T h i sc a nt h e nb es o l v e du s i n gt h ed e ﬁnition of inﬂation, b π
P
t = b Pt − b Pt−1 ,t h e
labour share b s = b wt + b Nt − b yt and the production function b y = 1





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































percentage point difference from base
Figure 1: Response of output and price & wage inﬂation to a 1-year, 1-point
rise in the nominal interest rat
30